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Abstract 
 
The impressive wealth of literature to international negotiation research 
testifies to the ever growing interest in and relevance of international 
negotiation theory as a field of academic study. While the scientific value of 
this research has never put into doubt, its practical usefulness for operational 
diplomatic activities is sometimes questioned by practitioners who either 
ignore the basics of negotiation theory or flatly discard them as being not 
relevant for real life conflicts and situations. Against this background it 
appeared timely and appropriate to confront some of the theorists´ key 
concepts with diplomats´ practical experience in relevant areas of 
international negotiations. 
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Introduction 
 
The topic of negotiation processes is gaining increasing recognition in political 
science and international affairs.  In the domestic and the international context 
negotiation theory and training have become a “growth industry” attracting enormous 
interest in the academic community. On both sides of the Atlantic universities and think 
tanks devote considerable energy to negotiation research. Today no political science 
department or institute dealing with international affairs can afford to ignore the study 
of the different aspects of negotiations. 
 
Negotiation theory and practice have conquered a central place in political science 
curricula. The study of negotiation processes is blossoming and has produced an 
impressive output of scientific literature which can fill entire book shelfs. This evolution 
of negotiation research is to be welcomed without reservation. No doubt, in the modern 
world negotiations have become the most common mode of human interaction. Global 
networking, global interdependence and cooperation, these are some of the keywords of 
the 21st Century. The interface of this web of human relations is verbal communication, 
in other words negotiation in the broadest sense, between the participants of the system. 
Communication and negotiation are at the heart of modern societies. With this in mind 
it appears only fitting that academic institutions promote and emphasize the study of 
negotiations in all their aspects. 
  
Paradoxical as it may seem the surge of negotiation studies did not yet lead to any 
significant synergies between negotiation theory and practice.  The impact of 
negotiation research and teaching on the actual conduct of real life negotiations is still 
rather limited. The key players involved in negotiations rarely carry in their intellectual 
baggage the knowledge which is currently taught by negotiation theorists. Those who 
happen to sit at the negotiation table usually come from very different career 
backgrounds. Only few of them could be called experts in negotiation theory. The lack 
of theoretical training in negotiation theory apparently does not disqualify those who are 
called upon to conduct the business of negotiating. This state of affairs differs 
fundamentally from other disciplines where it would be totally unthinkable to see a 
practitioner without profound theoretical knowledge of his discipline. For example, who 
could imagine a heart surgeon without a sound theoretical background in internal 
medicine? Apparently, in the field of negotiations things are different. The assumption 
there seems to be that one can learn by doing, i.e. by negotiating, and that the art of 
negotiation is something one acquires by inspiration or common sense rather than by 
reading books written by negotiation theorists.  
 
The exchange between the academic community specializing in negotiation theory 
and practitioners appears underdeveloped to put it mildly. Undeniably, there is a 
communication gap between theory and practice in the field of negotiation processes. 
This deficit separates professionals and academics to the extent that a number of 
practitioners even challenge the findings of negotiation theory by asserting that they 
have little or no relevance for real life situations.  Practitioners appear to be particularly 
reticent about formal models developed by negotiation research. They often question the 
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practical value of mathematical approaches to negotiation processes. The assertion that 
negotiation theory is somewhat aloof and out of sync with “the real needs of real 
negotiators”   is often heard in diplomatic circles. Another critique made to researchers 
is the jargon that they sometimes use. This critique should not be taken lightly because 
negotiation theory can not be disconnected from practice. Negotiation theory must not 
remain in the ivory tower of academia but has a responsibility to contribute to the 
solution of the great problems of today`s  world.  No doubt, a peaceful solution of these 
problems requires negotiated agreements.  
 
It is in this spirit that members of the Steering Committee of the Processes of 
International Negotiations (PIN) program of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg near Vienna, Austria, 
organized a one day workshop “Theorists meet Practitioners” and assembled eminent 
scholars, diplomats and practitioners with a view to find a common ground among the 
two groups of participants.  
 
Of course this subject has been addressed many times in the past 20 years, see e.g. 
(George 1993)1. Attempts have also been made by the PIN Program (Caldwell 2003), 
and eminent practitioners have been invited regularly to PIN workshops and published 
their views in the resulting books in the past. In view of the assessment made by the 
PIN Steering Committee some time ago (PINPoints Editorial 2006), that in the age of 
globalization the new negotiators ”are likely to be more receptive to communications 
from the research community concerning the conditions, mechanisms and functions of 
international negotiations”, it appeared now timely and appropriate to confront some of 
the theorists´ key concepts, which had been developed in a number of PIN books, with 
diplomats´ practical experience in relevant areas of international negotiations,  
 
The basic concept of the workshop was to confront researchers and practitioners on 
a given theme or method such as formal models, the concepts of escalation, power 
symmetry versus asymmetry, and the burning issue of international terrorism in order to 
see whether the findings of negotiation theory had relevance for the topics chosen in the 
view of the practitioners. The workshop was conceived as a structured dialogue between 
academics and practitioners on issues of common concern.  It was held on 20 June 2008 
under the auspices of IIASA in its headquarters. More than 50 participants including ten 
Ambassadors, military officials, NGO representatives, University professors and 
students attended the workshop. Ambassador Franz Cede opened the workshop and 
explained its objectives. Thereafter, the four themes mentioned above were examined in 
four panels respectively. In each panel one theoretical concept was presented by a 
theorist and then commented by a practitioner2. A general discussion with an outlook on 
future plans concluded the day. 
 
The following presentation of the four panels ist not so much a summing up but 
rather a reflection of what the organizers understood  to be the substance of the debates. 
Therefore, independent conclusions are drawn and a number of recommendations are 
offered.  
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First Panel: Formal Models 
 
The relevance of formal models for real life negotiations was examined by the 
theorist with the help of a game theoretical model of the current conflict between the 
International Community and the Iran about the latter´s nuclear program (Avenhaus und 
Huber 2007).   
 
Before, he presented a classification of the role of formal models in the context of 
international negotiations which had been developed in a PIN project the results of 
which were published in a book a year ago (Avenhaus and Zartman 2007): In short 
“Formal models of international negotiations are either abstract mathematical 
theories…which present solutions to bargaining problems, but do not really describe 
negotiation processes, rather, they give advise on how to agree immediately. Formal 
models in international negotiations are heuristic and dynamic by their very nature…, 
Formal models for international negotiations are used to combine the preferences of the 
parties into optimal outcomes… .” 
 
After this classification the theorist turned to the presentation of a game theoretical 
model of the conflict about Iran´s nuclear program. Technically speaking, it is a non-
cooperative two-person game with vector-valued payoffs in normal form. The pure 
strategies of the Iran are the five combinations of i) remaining party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty for Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or not, ii) if yes, fulfilling the treaty 
obligations or not and iii) if yes, enriching Uranium or not. The pure strategies of the 
international community are i) using military force to destroy Iran´s nuclear facilities, ii) 
accepting Iran as a nuclear power, iii) flexible sanctions and iv) grand bargain. 
 
The payoffs to both parties are given in terms of a vector with three components, the 
values of which express for the Iran i) independent nuclear power supply, ii) national 
security and iii) status of a dominant regional power. For the International Community 
they express i) preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power, ii) maintenance of 
regional stability and iii) continuing supply of oil and gas from the region. 
 
This game has two Nash equilibria (Nash 1951)3. The first one means that the Iran 
does not remain party to the NPT and that the International Community uses military 
force. The second one means that the Iran remains party to the NPT and fulfills its 
obligations but enriches Uran, and that the International Community enters into a grand 
bargain. Also, for both sides all payoffs of the first equilibrium are worse than those of 
the second one, technically speaking, the first equilibrium is payoff-dominated by the 
second one. 
 
The presentation of this game theoretical model was closed with some remarks 
about the insight gained with the help of this model which were elaborated in the 
subsequent discussion and about the limitations of the model: In particular the reduction 
of the International Community to one player was mentioned, and also the neglect of 
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dynamical aspects of negotiations. These limitations, however, were necessary for the 
tractability of the model, otherwise more and questionable assumptions would have 
become necessary, and more equilibria would have been produced which then could no 
longer be evaluated.   
 
The practitioner opened his contribution by reminding the audience to those 
important international negotiations held in Vienna like the Vienna Congress in 1814 
and the meeting between J.F. Kennedy and N. Khrushchev in 1960. Referring to these 
examples he went on to his first important observation: “Diplomacy is human. We make 
mistakes. How can formal models take care of these facts?” 
 
The second observation dealt with the assumptions of the Iran model. Having 
studied the model already a year ago, in view of its limitations he raised the question if 
the model could still provide useful information. In particular he discussed the 
assumption that the International Community was just one player – even though he 
found the level of consensus among the states remarkable – and that even in the Iran 
different opinions can be observed. He mentioned also Non-Governmental 
Organisations which have to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, he concluded, “ 
I am a novice in all of this, and I appreciate in you informing me”. 
 
The general discussion centered about the two major aspects raised by the 
practitioner. One of the theorists considered formal models to be the bones, to which 
practice puts the flesh. The panel´s theorist added information, after some comments on 
simplification, on the relevance of the assumptions about Iran´s strategies and the 
conclusions which were drawn: He showed, e.g., that the military option of the 
International Community stabilizes its Grand Bargain equilibrium strategy in that sense 
that the pure existence of the military option makes any deviation of the Iran from the 
equilibrium much more costly for the Iran than for the International Community. 
Finally, the practitioner emphasized the necessity of taking into account uncertainties, 
e.g. about the adversaries´s intentions. 
 
Second Panel: Escalation 
 
The dramatic negotiations with the Yugoslav regime prior to the NATO air 
campaign in 1999 are a textbook case of escalation. Here, all the elements of the 
structures of escalation and negotiations can and have been identified as demonstrated 
in one of PIN´s projects, the purpose of which was “whether negotiation is the possible 
sequel to escalation; that is, not whether stalemates must take place before negotiation, 
but whether negotiation can take place after escalation “ (Zartman and Faure 2005).  
 
The theorist pointed out that behind or underneath the idea of escalation leading to a 
mutually hurting stalemate in negotiation are the idea of hurt and the idea of 
negotiation. In other words, escalation can go on forever, but it comes into the situation 
or creates a situation that both sides feel stuck in this escalation, they can go no further 
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and this business of being stuck hurts them. Then the idea of negotiation is that they 
start a process of crafting together a common outcome that will be attractive to both 
sides, mutually hurting stalemate leading to the opening of the negotiation. 
 
He then developed these concepts at the hand of the Kosovo case, and he discussed 
why the Ramboulliet negotiations failed. One position identified interim autonomy but 
was not worked out between parties. Negotiation was absent. So the mediation did not 
mediate negotiation and it did not make the stalemate felt or hurt. And it did not bring 
the parties to produce an outcome. Was the theory wrong? No, the theory was perfectly 
correct. It pointed out conditions that, if they existed, would lead to particular results. 
But the conditions did not exist and the parties who were working to implement them 
did not succeed. The value of the theory in cases like that, the theorist concluded, is to 
point out what had to be done even though it was difficult to do. 
 
The practitioner, who took part in the negotiations in Rambouillet in 1999 as the 
Representative of the European Union, had agreed to test PIN´s theoretical findings 
with his long years of practical experience in the Balkans. He confirmed that 
practitioners should avoid simplifications and that his presentation would mirror the 
complexitiy of not just the Kosovo issue but also its environment. In so doing he 
referred to his and two colleagues´ book published in 1999 (Petritsch, Kaser and Pichler 
1999).  
 
In that spirit he started with the Dayton agreement in 1995 where the decision was 
taken to fully focus on Bosnia and Herzegowina and leave all the other trouble spots in 
the former Yugoslavia for methodological, political and other reasons. But the 
consequences for the Kosovo was that it changed forever the situation there, and this 
was the turning point. The practitioner then described in detail the development which 
finally led to the unsuccessful negotiations in Rambouillet in 1999. In so doing he 
referred to the concept of escalation. It was the tool of S. Milosevic throughout the 
Yugoslavian conflict; he used it whenever something went wrong for him. So he did 
when he abrogated the autonomy fo Kosovo in 1985 which was the starting point of the 
Kosovo conflict. 
 
The practitioner made a big leap after Dayton to 1997 at which time the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) had been transformed from a guerilla movement into a people´s 
army which he defined as another step on the escalation ladder. In June 1998 S. 
Milosevic and B. Yeltsin had agreed to let the international community play a role in the 
conflict which resulted in the so-called Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) 
with the three partners United States, Russia and European Union. However the 
escalation went on in the field, resulting in an exodus of 365 000 ethnic Albanians at the 
end of August 1998.  
 
Thus it was clear that the KDOM did not work and consequently, the next step was 
the so-called Milosevic-Holbrook agreement leading to the Kosovo Verification 
Mission (KVM), meaning not just observation but verification, and for the first time 
including NATO. By December 1998 and only two months after the installation of the 
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KVM it was clear that this was too little and too late and in parallel, the conflict on the 
ground was escalating. 
 
And then, yet another turning point in January 1999, the so-called real massacre of 
Rajak, took place. Whereas the response on the United States´ side was to urge for 
military action, the European side emphasized coercive dipomacy. In any case S. 
Milosevich agreed the first time to negotiate outside his country, grudgingly accepting 
the KLA as a partner. On 25 February the negotiations in Rambouillet started, however, 
without Milosevich. 
 
In the theorist´s words, the practitioner put with his practical experience flesh to the 
bones. Following this remark, the discussion centered first around the concepts of 
escalation, mutually hurting stalemate and related issues. “How can the perception in a 
mutually hurting stalemate be measured?” asked on participant. Also the threat for 
escalation was discussed. It cannot be a bluff instead, the consequences of such threat 
have to be thought through, another practitioner remarked. And again, he emphasized 
“People matter. When Milosevich was negotiating, he was not negotiating based on the 
interest of Serbia. He was based on his own interest and I think in the end what was 
critical to the negotiation and escalation was putting at risk his grip on power...”   
 
Another major issue in the general discussion was the role of the mediator who was 
mentioned at varius occasions. Is he party to negotiation? No, he is not, but he is 
interested in an outcome; he can even be interested in a particular outcome which 
happened quite a few times. Thus, he may become a very engaged or manipulative 
mediator. 
 
Third Panel: Symmetry versus Asymmetry 
 
In his introductory statement the theorist started with some deliberations on the 
definition of power, which is in his words a very elusive concept, difficult to grasp. He 
defined power as an action by one party intending to produce movement by the 
other.This way power is neither defined as a source nor as a result, but something in 
between the two – he called it purposeful action. 
 
Thereafter he drew the attention to the case of Andorra to illustrate a typical 
situation in which the relationship between the actors in the political process is 
characterized by asymmetry (Faure and Klaousen 2003). In fact, this case study 
exemplifies asymmetry in its extreme form, i.e. interaction of a micro-state (Andorra) 
with much larger entities (France, Spain, EU) being able to exert a great measure of 
power over the small entity. It was shown that such an asymmetric relationship does not 
necessarily lead to the complete submission of the mini-entity to the larger ones. The 
theorist demonstrated how a small state, by coincidence of happy circumstances, e.g., 
lack of interest by France, may increase its room of manoeuvre considerably. Another 
successful strategy for a weaker party, he explained, is to put its destiny in the hands of 
a third party.  
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 The conclusion to be drawn from the case of Andorra was to show that negotiations 
between parties in an asymmetric system need not be a lost cause for the weaker party 
and, to some degree, the imbalance between the actors can be evened out by clever 
strategies or fortunate circumstances.  
 
The practitioner then presented the case of Liechtenstein as seen from the vantage 
point of practice. He was also able to show how in real life the slogan “small is 
beautiful” applies to this tiny principality which has successfully survived as an 
independent subject of international law. He put the focus of his exposé on the 
experience of Liechtenstein within the framework of international organizations where, 
according to the rules of the game, each member, great or small, enjoys the same formal 
status. Through her membership in a number of intergovernmental organizations 
Liechtenstein is able to make her voice heard at the international level. Formal rights are 
thus another factor which flattens out, at least to some extent, the power disparities 
present in the international system.  
 
In the course of the discussion the theorist stressed the fact that there is no such 
thing as a completely symmetric relationship between the actors involved. Another 
practitioner added a further interesting aspect of “symmetry versus asymmetry” in 
today´s world by  referring to the capacity of the representatives of small states to 
influence the global agenda. In recent years the key agenda of global negotiations was 
shaped by small states rather than by the big powers. One example was mentioned: The 
driving force in the negotiations on climate change or on certain aspects of disarmament 
was a coalition of small states and not that of powerful nations. In any asymmetric 
framework, small states may thus play, a far greater role than their actual size and 
economic resources would suggest. The reason for this comparative advantage of small 
actors on the international scene resides in their lean management and the fact that, in 
general, they conduct their foreign policy unbridled by domestic considerations which 
usually hamper powerful states to take clear cut positions abroad. 
 
Fourth Panel: International Terrorism 
 
The theorist discussed the principal problems and challenges involved  in 
negotiations with terrorists or organizations deemed as terrorist (Faure and Zartman, 
forthcoming). She identified first the difficulty of finding an area in which the minimum 
acceptable positions of all actors overlap. This area is also referred to as “zone of 
possible agreement” (ZOPA). Secondly, she dealt with the distinction between 
“absolute” and “contingent terrorists” meaning those who are not disposed to 
negotiations and others who use terrorist acts for instrumental purposes. Only in the 
latter case there a ZOPA can be looked for.  
 
Thirdly, the theorist stressed the importance of influencing the support base of 
terrorists in order to make them realize the infeasibility of absolute demands and 
extreme positions. She went on to underline the problem of recognition as a key factor 
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in negotiations with terrorists. Without some sort of recognition meaningful 
negotiations with terrorists can hardly begin. Finally, she touched upon the problems of 
commitment, meaning the difficulties of both sides to commit themselves to a 
settlement in a credible manner. 
 
The practitioner brought with him the experience of the former European Union 
coordinator in counter-terrorism. He informed the participants about the policies of the 
European Union in fighting international terrorism. There are four main categories, 
namely 
 • To prevent attacks, • To pursue terrorists and to bring them to justice, • To protect borders and critical infrastructures, and  • To respond effectively in case an attack takes place. 
 
“Where does negotiation fit in?” he then asked, and answered “Not very well”, even 
though he admitted that at occasions indeed there is room for negotiation.  
There can be, for example, a role for negotiation if a terrorist organisation or network is 
divided internally to such a degree that negotiation can help the moderate side obtain a 
victory against the radicals. 
 
The valuable insights of the practitioner drawn from practice greatly contributed to a 
substantial discussion that followed. He spoke at some length about the issue of listing a 
group as terrorist organization.  Some speakers stressed the importance of preventive 
measures in order to combat terrorism effectively. The discussions about the 
controversial topic became sometimes contentious themselves. They showed that 
negotiation theory could not offer simple recipes for dealing with terrorists in practice.  
 
In the discussions it became apparent that, in a concrete situation, negotiations with 
terrorists were unavoidable when the lives of innocent hostages were at stake. However, 
the point was stressed quite convincingly that the combat against terrorism required a 
better response than taking action when it is already too late, i.e. when the terrorist 
attack had already occurred. In this spirit the practitioner spoke in favour of examining 
the root causes of international terrorism. Such an approach would aim at developing a 
strategy designed to prevent terrorist acts by addressing the major grievances that feed 
into radicalization. With this focus the debate about “negotiation with terrorists” took on 
a completely new dimension as it put the problem of terrorism into a broader political 
context. It may please theorists and practitioners alike that it was concluded that 
whatever ought to be done to design and to carry out such a strategy against terrorism 
for all actors and stakeholders the instrument of negotiations will remain indispensable. 
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 Conclusions 
 
Formal conclusions were not drawn at the end of this very rich one day workshop, 
but a few observations, which included discussions subsequent to the workshop, may 
reflect the experience gained by this enterprise. Even though one of the organizers had 
been a professional practitioner, the workshop was organized also by him on behalf of 
PIN therefore, at present the following remarks tend to reflect the theorists´ impressions. 
 
Two issues which were raised by the practitioners, recurred in all four panels 
namely the human factor in negotiations and the complexity of the problems to be 
negotiated. All practitioners raised doubts – keyword oversimplification – if theorists 
were able to cope with these two issues in a way that they could produce results which 
might help in real negotiations. 
 
The answer of the theorists went into two directions. First, they argued, in general 
theorists are trying to find guiding principles and underlying laws, but they can rarely 
solve immediate problems. Physicists for example detected the laws which determine 
wind and weather, formulated finally as Bernoulli and Navier-Stokes differential 
equations, but this does not mean that they are now able to predict the form of the 
clouds in the sky of Vienna at the next day. Yet these equations have tremendous 
practical applications. Similarly, negotiation theorists develop concepts like prisoners´ 
dilemma or chicken for practitioners, or hurting stalemate and ripeness, but they cannot 
model, e.g., the chemistry between two chief negotiators. According to one of the 
panelists, as mentioned, theorists provide the bones, and practitioners put the flesh on it.  
 
Second, there may be “hot issues” which suddenly require attention and which pose 
new problems to practitioners. As an example the Ecuador-Peru border conflict was 
mentioned in which theorists brought constructive analysis to area  specialists who 
knew in depth all the reasons why the conflict was not and could not be resolved 
(Einaudi 1999). Practical advice can also be given in those situations where 
technological, in particular quantitative problems are at stake. Examples from the past, 
which were mentioned in this context, were the negotiations of the verification 
agreement for the Non-Proliferation Treaty for Nuclear Weapons (Ungerer 2002), the 
Law of the Sea negotiations (Sebenius 1981) or the role of IIASA´s RAINS model for 
European environmental negotiations (Tuinstra, Hordijk and Amann 1999). In these 
latter cases, it has to be admitted, advise was given rather by technical experts than by 
negotiation theorists. 
 
It was known before that the workshop´s objective was not simple, and it turned out 
to be true: theorists tended to talk about their theories, and practitioners about their 
experience. Both sides listened carefully and interested to what the other sides said and 
what was new to them in most cases. But only in a few situations really a dialog 
developed in the sense that both sides were learning for their own benefit – theorists for 
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improving their theories, and practitioners for using theoretical findings in negotiations 
to come. 
 
Of course nobody expected that in a one day workshop. It was a first attempt, using 
Habermas´ words “to create a healthy dialogue which does not necessarily aim at a 
substance, but rather at a form of interaction” (Habermas 1981). Thus, and this was 
widely accepted, this kind of enterprise should be continued, with specific topics, and 
next time perhaps organized by a practitioner. 
 
For a future dialogue of this kind a framework should be developed by which the 
discussion can be held in a highly structured manner. At the end of such an exercise a 
joint assessment by the participating theorists and practitioners should be made 
evaluating the outcome. 
 
Two types of theoretical expertise can be distinguished which were represented in 
the four panels. The first type refers to the theoretical knowledge of negotiation analysts 
who formulate genuine, even abstract theoretical concepts. The second one relates to 
scientific expertise required in a particular negotiation process. 
 
The following four aspects address the first type. 
i) Origin of the theory: Practical experience of the theorist, or induction from 
practice, or deduction from assumptions? 
ii) General experience of the practitioner with theoretical concepts: Useful in 
general or even in a concrete case? 
iii) Ways of communication between both sides: Textbooks and lectures given 
by the theorist? Participation of theorists in negotiations? Kind of 
consulting? 
iv) Joint analysis after the negotiation? 
 
The following three aspect address the second type. 
i) Purpose of the models: Descriptive, predictive or normative? Models of, for, 
or in negotiations? 
ii) Practitioners´ understanding: What degree of understanding of quantitative 
analysis is necessary for the negotiator? How much time can he spend for 
learning? 
iii) Reaction to negotiation progress: Should the theorist be available during the 
negotiations? 
 
For both types it would be highly desirable that practitioners offer their views on a 
concrete negotiation problem and suggest topics for research. It might well result from 
such an exchange that these topics receive a closer study by the academic community.  
 
In this way with time a joint body of knowledge would develop which could be used 
both by theorists and practitioners. In this context we are pleased to note that one of the 
pioneers of international negotiation analysis, Howard Raiffa, alluded to this challenge, 
confronting theorists and practitioners alike, already in 1991 (Raiffa 1991): 
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 “Regrettably, a lot of profound theorizing by economists, mathematicians, 
philosophers, and game theorists on topics related to negotiation analysis has had little 
or no impact on practice. An important question for the PIN Project to answer will be 
why this is so. An important reason is clearly the lack of effective communication and 
dissemination of theoretical research results. Such communication could be improved if 
there were more intermediaries who are comfortable in both worlds and who could act 
as inventive go-betweens to facilitate the transfer of information that shows how theory 
can influence practice and how practice can influence the research agendas of theorists. 
The  
information must flow in both directions: many practitioners have developed valid, 
extremely useful, and often profound insights and analyses, which should help to guide 
the agendas of researchers in this field.”   
 
These findings are as valid today as they were 18 years ago when they were 
formulated at the occasion of the foundation of the PIN Project. 
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Endnotes 
 
1A. George did not explicitly report on dialogues between theorists and practitioners, 
and half of his small book is devoted to the US policy in the Iraq from 1988 to 1991. 
His overall subject, however, is precisely the gap betwen theory and practice in 
international relations which he thinks can not be closed  but only be bridged. 
2The theorists of the four panels were Rudolf Avenhaus, I. William Zartman, Johns 
Hopkins University, Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne University, and Kristine Höglund, 
University of Upsala. The practitioners were Gregor L. Schulte, United States 
Ambassador to the International Organisations in Vienna, Ambassador Wolfgang 
Petritsch, former High Representative of the International Community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Dr. Gregor Obenaus, Director of the Cabinet of the Prince of 
Liechtenstein, and Ambassador Gijs de Vries, former European Uninion Coordinator in 
Counter-Terrorism. 
3A Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game is defined as a pair of strategies with 
the property that any unilateral deviation of one player from that equilibrium strategy 
does not improve the deviator´s payoff. 
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